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**MESSAGE FROM
DR. ASHOK K. CHAUHAN
FOUNDER PRESIDENT OF AMITY
EDUCATION GROUP**

**AND
PRESIDENT OF AMITY INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE & STRATEGIC
STUDIES (AIDSS)**

“The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance- it is the illusion of knowledge.”

- DJ Boorstin, Historian from USA

This issue of the Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Studies (AJDSS) carries seminal articles on multi-dimensional strategic aspects of significance, as well as contemporary challenges, which beset our Nation. I am sanguine that the contents will stimulate wide readership and enrich the intellectual capital of the Amity student fraternity and others encouraging ‘de novo’ thoughts on strategic and military issues.

I take this opportunity to compliment Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), DG AIDSS and Editor of this Journal and his editorial team comprising Brig BB Varma (Retd) and Dr Ritu Grover on their notable initiative and envisioned strategic perspective under stewardship of Dr W Selvamurthy, President Amity Science, Technology & Innovation Foundation (ASTIF) for selecting diverse articles by eminent authors of our tri-services, who have held coveted positions during their brilliant service careers.

**Noida
Date: 15 October 2020**

**Dr. Ashok K. Chauhan
Founder President
Amity Education Group**



**MESSAGE FROM
DR. ATUL CHAUHAN
CHANCELLOR AUUP**

We are pleased to release this issue of the Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Studies (AJDSS), which is expected to serve as a veritable platform for sharing imaginative thought process of various authors through their articles and opinions of research scholars working on Defence and Strategic issues at the national and global level. The Journal would incontrovertibly coalesce perceptions of prolific writers and strategic thinkers through the medium of this publication, combining academic rigor with policy relevance.

The Journal will serve as an educational focal area providing research scholars and practitioners an opportunity to share their creative intellect and innovative ideas on a wide spectrum of issues pertaining to defence policies and reforms, national security, foreign affairs, international relations, etc specifically from the defence perspective. It would also be a consistent endeavor to encourage articles from the students' fraternity, with pertinence to multidimensional nature of internal and transnational threats, growth of emerging science & defence technologies, UN Peacekeeping dilemmas, Terrorism & Insurgencies and significant contemporary issues and create excellent growth models of transformational paradigm, contributing on a holistic plane to greater peace and stability in the world.

I sincerely hope the articles published in AJDSS will highlight the strategic imperatives and magnitude of myriad challenges, having a global dimension, thereby co-opting "disruptive solutions & strategized options". These articles would contribute 'food for thought' towards good governance, by supplementing a 'de novo' approach, to benefit organizational structures and world class institutions. We look forward to a comprehensive feedback with cogent suggestions from the wide readership. I wish to convey my appreciation to Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), DG AIDSS and Editor of this Bi-annual Journal, who has produced this Journal with his editorial team for good of posterity.

**Noida
Date: 15 October 2020**

**Dr. Atul Chauhan
Chancellor
Amity University, Uttar Pradesh**



**MESSAGE FROM
PROF. (DR.) BALVINDER SHUKLA
VICE CHANCELLOR AUUP**

This issue of the Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Review (AJDSS) is praiseworthy, as the articles authored by eminent senior military officers, faculty professors and former diplomats have reflected the strategic effects of the subjects with an animated perspective and their relevance to the national and global domain.

The students' community and faculty at Amity University will be enlightened and gain meaningfully from the Journal, as it would provide research material and assist scholars to undertake detailed analyses of the subjects and articulate their candid opinions in various fora. It would also serve as an excellent medium to showcase benchmarked defence concepts and philosophies, conflict of interest between nations in geo-political, economic and diverse issues, with impact on the national and regional matrix. The Journal in future editorials will also reflect and focus on various 'state of art' doctrines and synergized technologies being developed to enhance defence preparedness and security in the world. Matters related to foreign policy, military strategies, geo-politics and diplomacy too will find an important place in the Journal to serve national needs.

Our long-term goal is to achieve the highest standards of academic rigor. I wish to compliment Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), DG AIDSS and Editor of this Bi-annual Journal, who has conceptualized and produced this Journal commendably with his editorial team under the guidance of our visionary Hon'ble Founder President, Dr Ashok K. Chauhan. We wish the Journal great success and qualitative enhancement in the years ahead.

Noida
Date: 15 October 2020

Prof. (Dr). Balvinder Shukla
Vice Chancellor
Amity University, Uttar Pradesh



**MESSAGE FROM
DR. W. SELVAMURTHY
VICE PRESIDENT AMITY INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE
& STRATEGIC STUDIES (AIDSS)**

The Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Studies (AJDSS) has been conceptualized and professionally crafted by Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), DG AIDSS and Editor of this Bi-annual Journal, with his editorial team under the guidance and prescience of our Hon'ble Founder President, Dr Ashok K. Chauhan. Most of the articles have an endemic strategic essence with a regional or a global perspective, whereas some contents would reflect on behavioral, ethical leadership and motivational issues.

The present generation of Amity students are brilliant with a very fine understanding acquired through tutelage and mentoring provided by the eminent faculty, direction by distinguished guest speakers, as also assisted by the contemporary and friendly social media. Their assimilative powers are honed, which enables better comprehension of macro issues as related to critical defence and national security issues, geo-politico-economic strategic matters, foreign affairs and international relations etc at the national and global level.

I am confident that the AJDSS would induce wide readership, with some significant suggestions and views sent to the Editorial team for desired synthesis. The salient recommendations would be compiled and sent to the decision makers for their consideration.

Noida
Date: 15 October 2020

Dr. W. Selvamurthy
President ASTIF
Vice President AIDSS



**MESSAGE FROM
PROF. (DR.) V YOGA JYOTSNA
HOI & DEAN AMITY INSTITUTE OF
DEFENCE & STRATEGIC STUDIES (AIDSS)**

I take immense pride in the release of this issue of the Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Studies (AJDSS), where creative instincts of eminent officers and civilian authors alike have reflected their ingenuine thoughts with notable recommendations as solutions to the various problems on the subjects. This would also be a fine benchmark to researchers at Amity University with domain centricity on Defence, National Security and International Affairs with a national and global dimension.

The AJDSS would unequivocally attract the defence personnel, research scholars and also the practitioners to defence policies and reforms, national security, foreign affairs, international relations, etc specifically from the defence perspective. In the current world scenario of the Pandemic environment, new strategic alignments are ensuing between nations and the conflagration on sensitive issues is becoming highly probable and could be extremely catastrophic. The UN Security Council and Peacekeeping Forces are finding it difficult to resolve insurgency and terrorism infested regional areas and maintain the desired equilibrium of peace and stability, despite assurances of assistance from Member states. I am certain the students will attain scholastic excellence by gaining knowledge and pursuing research in their respective areas of interest towards a successful career path in their lives. The articles published in AJDSS have visibly manifested strategic necessities and national interests of the country in perspective, with some evolved solutions and recommendations commensurate to the turbulent times with equally complex issues.

I wish to convey my profound appreciation to Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), DG AIDSS and Editor of this Bi-annual Journal, who has worked assiduously with his endemic passionate zeal to produce this Journal with the editorial team. We look forward to a wide readership and feedbacks to further enhance the publication under his stewardship.

Noida
Date: 15 October 2020

Prof. (Dr.) V Yoga Jyotsna
HoI & Dean AIDSS



FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK
LT GEN (DR) SK GADEOCK, AVSM (RETD)
DIRECTOR GENERAL AMITY INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE &
STRATEGIC STUDIES (AIDSS)

This issue of the Newsletter 'Amity Journal of Defence & Strategic Review (AJDSS)' has conformed to the visionary foresight, professional outlook and mission-oriented approach of our Founder President, in its maiden endeavor to publish articles with strategic discernment of critical issues, affecting the peace equilibrium and stability in the region and world at large.

The aim of AJDSS is to provide conceptual, intellectual and strategic thought provoking articles towards greater awareness of our Amity student fraternity and all readers of the geo-strategic paradigm. The qualitative solutions on problems related to critical politico-economic strategic matters, defence and national security issues, foreign affairs policies etc, would contribute towards better governance and statecraft. India's national interests and global objectives would also be analyzed beyond the narrow confines of the South East Asia regional dynamics and the 'Way Ahead' required by strategic leaders and thinkers, engaged in evolving issues.

The various external threat manifestations to the nation and imminent 'flash points' in the world, attributed to nuclear armament, disputed territorial borders of nations to include maritime domain, which could possibly conflagrate into any spectrum of conflict, may be of greater interest to our readers. The global complexities in maintenance of international peace, harmony and security, terrorism and insurgencies, affecting the various Members States of the United Nations in the above perspective.

I sincerely hope the AJDSS evokes an animated response from wide readership, with some diverse suggestions and viewpoints sent to the Editorial team for incisive analysis of the subject, which requires clarification.

Noida
Date: 15 October 2020

Lt Gen (Dr) SK Gadeock, AVSM (Retd)
Director General AIDSS

A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE ON A TWO FRONT WAR

“Army, Navy and Air Force are the military instruments of State Power. The history of warfare bears testimony that ultimate victory in war will be achieved through jointness among the three services”

-Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Former President of India, Bharat Ratna

While the Indian Army was engaged in giving a befitting response to flexing of muscles by the PLA (Army) across the LAC, the aircraft and helicopters of the Indian Air Force were operationally deployed from the forward bases and maintained in a high state of alert. The assets of the Indian Navy, in terms of Long-Range Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft the P-8I and the MIG-29K fighter aircraft were also deployed in a synergized combat dimension with units of the Air Force and the Army for specific missions along the Northern border. In the Indian Ocean Region, which is our primary area of interest in the maritime domain, Indian Navy assets were deployed for exercises and specific missions. The Armed Forces of India, were therefore ready to counter any challenges or misadventures by China.

It may be noted that the escalation matrix for two nations to come to blows and engage in war is a gradual and deliberate process. Several institutionalized mechanisms between potential belligerents and world bodies try and prevent its uncontrolled escalation. This graduated response calibrates the other nations will and resolve to negotiate with strength or capitulate as so famously noted in the Melian Dialogue. The seeds of conflict are sown in localized disputes which results in skirmishes and raids, handled at the local commander's level, followed up with strikes on fortifications resulting in local engagements with limited use of ordnance and causing minimal casualties and collateral damages. The conflict is still localized between the respective posts on the borders or in the limited area where there is a dispute. Simultaneously diplomatic engagements, propaganda and informational campaigns are launched to help resolve the conflict expeditiously on terms that are honorable to both belligerents which is easier said than done. It is only when the escalation reaches the dimensions of a battle, the nation as a whole respond. This is when the diplomatic engagements are pursued vigorously. When

diplomacy collapses wars happen. Even so, before a full spectrum full blown war erupts another set of graduated responses begin with pitched battles followed up with limited conventional war and finally, God forbid, a nuclear war. If hard positions are taken, specially by the more potent power, the choice for the weaker power is fight or flight. In this decision, the armed forces of the nation are only one amongst the several organs of warfighting. A nation's industrial might, its population, its social and political culture, its economy and its commitment to the cause are vital factors in the decision to go to war. And, to remind: -

National Power = (EcoPower+MilPower+InfoPower+Diplomatic Power) x WILL of the Nation.

The Indian Navy uniquely has a stake in every aspect of national power. India 's quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean are twin factors that define her vast maritime interests. The responsibility of protecting these interests fall squarely on the shoulders of men in white uniform, as these have a vital relationship with the nation's economic growth, prosperity, development and international status. The purpose of Navies is in the final analysis to maintain peace and stability and prevent war and if war should occur it must win decisively.

However, the war at sea is uniquely different. Unlike the land frontiers, there are no visible geographical demarcation of "ours and theirs". There is no distinct and easy segregation of "own and their forces" since the commons are global and presence of neutrals is a given. The medium of conflict ranges from the sub-surface, surface, air, electronic, cyber and space. The vagaries of weather play a significant role on both the man and his machine in warfighting. And, finally a targeting mistake can trigger a world war. To explain, a Torpedoed tanker carrying crude for the belligerent may be built in Japan, owned by Greek, flagged in Panama, chartered in the UK, manned by Philippian, Bangladeshi and Norwegians, insured in Belgium and carrying Saudi crude worth millions of dollars paid by traders in Dubai and Singapore. Therefore, when navies get engaged in war the reverberations of conflict impact not only the belligerents but many other players in terms of higher charter fees, higher insurance, longer routing of the mercantile trade all of it impacting the economy of many nations.

Within war itself, a 'two-front war' is an escalation where a nation has to engage two nations acting in concert temporal and spatial separations. Akin to the Allies versus Axis combination that waged World War 2, multi front wars were simultaneously conducted across different geographies ranging from the European plains to African deserts to Asian forests and islands, and across land, air and sea. Hence, an armed conflict on two temporally and spatially separated fronts can be called a 'two-front war'. These 'fronts' could involve armed conflict waged in separate domains (air war and land war, situation war-at-sea and war-on-land, etc.), or, the conflict could be waged in geographically distinct theatres (for instance, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal) or in different times trading force with space. Added into the definition is the possibility of a simultaneous conflict of one State against two others.

For instance, the aim of the 600-ship US Navy of the 1980s was to gain Command of the Seas and also fight the Soviets on two maritime fronts, namely the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. In the Indian context, the 1971 Conflict with Pakistan, too, was a multi-dimensional 'two-front' campaign in the Western and Eastern front, combined with diplomatic and economic elements of national power. Signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with then USSR foreclosed options for the US and China to take sides in the war.

The possibility of such a 'two-front war' as an outcome of the present tensions with both neighbors who also have a clear common interest to gain access to heights and control the BRI is a real and pressing reality. China and Pakistan acting either in collaboration or collusion with each other, in waging war against India is the subject of this analysis, from a maritime perspective.

In such a situation three clear possibilities arise. This would depend upon which nations escalates and engages in an armed conflict against India. China and Pakistan could possibly choose either a collaborative or a collusive approach depending upon who instigates the war. A collaborative 'venture' would be overt and all resources, including its personnel, of one nation could be available to the other in its prosecution of war. On the other hand, a collusive understanding would

not make ‘personnel’ available but equipment and other support could be provided. These approaches could lead to the following scenario, among others:

- (a) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China intervenes with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favorable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low.
- (b) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral, technical and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China.
- (c) India and China are engaged in an armed conflict and Pakistan supports China by activating India's Western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such a support being extended by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is apparently high.

It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with China is quite likely to lead India into a two front war scenario, involving China and Pakistan.

Therefore, what is to be done?

As mentioned earlier, wars may be fought by the armed forces at a physical level whether jointly or individually depending upon the objectives of each campaign, but clearly it's the entire national power of one belligerent pitched against that of the other which decides its outcome. As is widely recognized there are no Runners up in war as the consequences of its outcome changes the destiny

of nations. Whether it was King Porus loss to Alexander or the loss of Ibrahim Lodi to Babur or the battle of Arcot India's destiny changed forever as an outcome of those wars. Remembering these truisms, a modern 'two-front war' must be planned as a national integrated, coordinated and harmonized effort of the entire capacity, capability and skill sets of the state to overcome the enemy decisively and certainly not executed in fragmented segments of individual armed forces winning local skirmishes but losing larger battles and wars. On the contrary, all three Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards achieving the political aims through utilizing their combined military might by trading time, space and force to achieve and leverage its competitive advantage across

In the case of China, maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the Air domain and at Sea in the Indian Ocean Region. In so far as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximize its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and geographical areas where China may have a relative advantage.

various fronts. In the case of China, maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the Air domain and at Sea in the Indian Ocean Region. In so far as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximize its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and geographical areas where China may have a relative advantage.

Such an approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre – not at the Corps level, but at the 'Theatre' level. Basically, rather than confronting the adversary reactively at a chosen point-of-attack of his determination to stem or contain it, India should also proactively create other points of attack to force the adversary to divide his forces and react to Indian initiatives. Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a geographical area or a domain and at a time of India's choosing, where combat potential of own Armed Forces is strong and that of the adversary is weak or vulnerable. It must also be factored that

Cyber Warfare encompassing all domains will play a major role in any future conflict and as a nation, India should be prepared to counter the adversary effectively in the cyber domain as well.

In the maritime domain, this would imply exploiting gaps in the adversary's Force Levels, ability to operate in certain sea areas, and deployment time periods where Indian Naval Supremacy is difficult to contest. Taking the maritime war to the South China Sea or in areas where China can support its surface combatants by its shore-based aircraft protection envelope is not an option. China's vulnerability is in the Indian Ocean where its merchant fleet transits over the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) carrying the goods, crude, commodities and resources that bolsters the Chinese economy. These oil arteries and trade routes have to transit within the Indian Navy's area of dominance and through vital choke points in the Indian Ocean. So, in addition to the 'Malacca Dilemma', China also has a 'Hormuz Nightmare'. This is the situation that must be exploited in waging war and opening a third front for the Chinese to contend with.

One strategy would be to engage in trade warfare under the definition of contraband cargo. Arrest and detention of vessels carrying cargo destined for Chinese/Pakistan Ports by Indian warships or forcing them to take longer routes would begin to impact the economy of China, however marginally it may be in the short term, but definitely a longer term 'loss of face'.

This would, then, force the Chinese to dispatch their surface units to 'visibly' protect its merchantmen. Should the PLA Navy decide to escort their mercantile fleet in the Indian Ocean Region, requiring their escort forces to forage into areas where Chinese shore-based air power cannot be brought to bear and where the Chinese logistics lines would be severely extended opens up possibilities of better exchange ratios in India's favour. Joint and combined operations with Indian Navy's CBG and Air Force Maritime strike aircraft coupled with space-based tracking systems would advantageously deal with the Chinese surface combatants. So far as the sub-surface element is concerned - a combination of forces could deliver catastrophic consequences. Loss of its ability to have continued access to markets, commodities and resources necessary for its economy may encourage finding faster diplomatic solutions before other players take

advantage of this situation and reacquire interest and assets in the South China sea with a little help from other powers.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are strategically located 1400 kms away from the Eastern Indian mainland and in proximity of Malacca strait. Suitable maritime reconnaissance, space and other assets, could be advantageously positioned, conforming to the operational imperatives in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, to use these as a launch pad for keeping the choke points, such as Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Ombai wetar straits in the island chains and the critical areas of interest in the IOR, under maritime surveillance. These are relatively simplistic examples showing how India might introduce war winning asymmetries in maritime warfare across ocean areas so as to draw China into forays whose outcomes would be so unfavorable as to nullify any advantages that it might achieve on land. Similarly, other avenues favourable to India in the domain of the air should be explored by the Indian Air Force.

Overall, every effort should be made to firstly identify those comparative advantages in maritime and airborne power that would exploit maneuverer and logistics in the design of battle. Forcing China to deploy its navy and divides its air force along extended logistics lines could result in reduction of its ability to support the land campaign. The concept of operations would need to synergistically dovetail several operational enablers, where India has decisive strengths such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Network Centric Operations and Cyber Warfare, joint-ness and coordination, Flexibility and Manoeuvre at sea to gain a favourable maritime environment in India's area of interest for 'Sea Control' of the SLOCs, by the aircraft carrier battle groups and 'Sea Denial' by its submarines. At the same time, any adventures initiated by the Pakistan Navy should be separately addressed and a highly aggressive campaign launched to ensure its influence in the 'two-front war' is limited to local naval defence of their ports and harbours only.

The first step in conflict prevention is effective deterrence. Effective deterrence is a qualitative aspect measured in terms of deterrent value, which in India's case, has been covered in detail in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS), 'Ensuring Secure Seas', 2015, "Strategy for Deterrence" (Indian Navy

2015, pp. 46-59). To paraphrase its core intent and communication it is a given that the “core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, will remain centered on conventional deterrence and conventional military forces” (Ibid, pp 50). Deterrence has to be credible to be effective and it does not come about through ownership of assets alone but a clear communication of the will of the nation to use it.

Therefore, to maintain a credible high deterrent posture, there is a need to maintain operational warfighting capabilities and assets in adequate quantity and quality. The Indian Navy is the principal instrument and manifestation of India’s maritime military power. The IMSS 2015 ‘Strategy for Conflict’ (Ibid, pp 60-77) requires the Navy to continuously hone its professional skills in warfighting to maximize the Navy’s combat potential through operational enablers and innovative concept of operators and design of battle. The aim would be to attain the country’s political objectives of war and bring the conflict to an early and favourable conclusion by influencing decisions on land. To do so, maritime operations would focus on the adversary’s political, military, economic, cyber, informational and psychological paradigms. As a part of the battle readiness and planning process identifying missions to achieve short term, mid-term and long-term objectives of a ‘two-front war’ and allocating resources for its enablement is a vital requirement.

The blue-print of the future Indian Navy envisages induction of a force level centered on three aircraft carriers, surface combatants, naval aviation assets and submarines both conventional and nuclear, along with cutting edge technology weapons and sensors, as part of a multidimensional integrated force. It is mandatory to have a ‘Blue Water’ Navy for the country in the prevalent environment, which certainly is not a provocation to war, but is the surest guarantor of peace in the Indian Ocean Region.

Adequate budgetary resources need to be allocated to ensure the timely development of the Navy as a credible and balanced force. Building such a force comes at some cost to the Government. The Navy’s force structure and force composition have been defined in the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCP). The MCP adopts a capability based and mission dominated approach for developing the Indian Navy as a balanced, multi-dimensional, networked force,

with multi-mission, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the full spectrum of combat power. Hence, irrespective of the source of the threat a capability to mitigate it exists.

However, to counter any thoughts of opening a ‘two-front war’ by the adversaries a credible deterrence posture and demonstrated combat potential of the Navy is a must. The Indian Navy has to be allotted its due share of the budget which has slipped to an abysmal low of about 12% of the total share from 17-18% some years ago. Also, no navy is built in a day or decade. Therefore, a comprehensive plan for the organized development of required capabilities to achieve specific mission requirements requires a long-term budgetary support expressly committed by the state. The Navy’s share of the defence budget should be restored to 18% at the earliest instance.

There is a clear need to continuously re-evaluate requirements, based upon technological advancements, geo-political developments, the areas of interest and influence and evolving operational philosophy. This must be an exercise that is undertaken at the strategic level where the nation as a whole integrates across the board its Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic and Space resources as the constituents of the national plan for addressing the contingencies of a two-front war. Downstream, the services must combine their capabilities to meet the operational directives that may be assigned to it. Following this would be single service missions and plans. The cost of preparation may well be high, but the price of failure is utterly unaffordable. The recently constituted Defence Planning Committee, while assessing the arithmetic of a two-front war could factor these considerations while evaluating the optional Indian response to a “worst case scenario” of a ‘two-front war’ with the possibility to open the “third front” at sea. As has been said *“To be secure on Land, we must be Supreme at Sea”*.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Admiral RK Dhowan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd) is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, the Defence Services Staff College and the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. The Admiral has commanded three front line warships of the Western Fleet and has served as the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet and Chief of Staff of the Eastern Naval Command. Important staff assignments held by the Admiral at Naval Headquarters during his distinguished career include Deputy Director Naval Operations, Joint Director Naval Plans, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy and Plans) and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. The Admiral assumed charge as the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff in Aug 2011 and was subsequently promoted as the 22nd Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy on 17 April 2014. He retired from the Navy on 31 May 2016 after a distinguished career of 42 years in uniform. Post his retirement, he took over as the fifth Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, which is India's premier maritime think tank. Lately, the Admiral is Chairperson, Society for Aerospace Maritime and Defence Studies. Email: adm_rkdhowan@samdesindia.in



INDIA-SOVIET UNION-RUSSIA – FRIENDSHIP OVER AGES

“Who controls the Food Supply controls the People, who controls Energy can control the whole Continents, who controls Money can control the World”

-Henry Kissinger, Former US Secretary of State

Ever since India became independent in 1947, the relations between India and Soviet Union picked up on a stronger note from mid 1950s onwards. The relations covering multilateral aspects of cooperation between the two countries were most enduring and almost on a platonic level. It continued so until 1991 when Soviet Union broke up and Russian Federation became its successor State. The bilateral relations, friendship, cultural relations have once again become enduring and are ever growing on a big scale. During the 1950s to 1970s, the Soviet Union helped India a lot in building up of steel plants and in other sectors of cooperation including the nuclear field. In 1984, Squadron Leader. Rakesh Sharma was even sent to Space, testifying to the high level of multi-sectoral cooperation between the two countries.

Coming to the friendship and cultural exchanges between the two countries, we have the India-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 which worked like an anchor for India during the liberation of Bangladesh. In 1987 the Soviet Union celebrated 70 years of October Revolution along with 40 years of India's independence. Thereafter from time to time 'days of Indian culture in Russia' and days of 'Russian Culture in India', are constantly celebrated on a regular scale.

Coming to history, the first Russian visitor to India was Afanasy Nikitin, a merchant from Tver in Russia. His famous journey (1466-1472) was documented in a book titled 'Journey beyond Three Seas'. In 1950s a Russian Actor Oleg Strizhenov with famous Actor Nargis Dutt made a film with the name 'Journey beyond Three Seas'. In 1722, Peter the Great met Anbu Ram, the leader of Indian Merchants in Astrakhan (Russia). They agreed to full free trade including transiting rights. 'Bhagavad Gita' was translated in 1788 by orders of Catherine the Great. Coming to present times, the names of Nicholas Roerich (1874-1947 settled in Himachal Pradesh) and Svetoslav Roerich (1904-1993 settled in Bangalore and married to an Indian Devika Rani), both Ideologists and artists, are

well known in India. Both in India and Russia, people with acute interest in each other's country are well known. Indian cinema and yoga have assumed a great popularity in Russia, beginning from the days of legendary Raj Kapoor and his film '*Awara*' whose songs are still hummed by Russians.

Details of the continuous growth of relations between India and Soviet Union and now Russia after 1991 highlighting the multilateral relations between India and Russia over decades have been summarised pointwise, as below, for an easy assimilation with clarity: -

- (a) India erstwhile USSR relations followed by India Russia relations following dissolution of USSR in December 1991 have been historically warm and friendly.
- (b) The Russian Empire formally came into being on 22 October 1721 and it was earlier preceded by Tsardom of Russia on 16 January 1547. The Russian revolution of 25 October 1917 removed the Russian Empire and the Russian Republic and Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was formally announced. After annexing most of the Central Asian Republics and other European Republics like Byelorussia, Ukraine etc., Russian Republic became the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922. Because of adoption of Gregorian calendar, the date 25 October 1917 became 7 November 1917 and the Russian Revolution is celebrated on this day. In 1940 with WWII, the three Baltic Republics: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia were also absorbed in Soviet Union.
- (c) The Soviet Union broke into fifteen Republics – Russian Republic and fourteen other Republics on 25 December 1991. It took exactly 69 years for the Soviet Union to disband. The breakup of Soviet Union was a Greek tragedy and was largely as a result of some of the misdoings of the then Soviet leaders for their personal ambitions. Still the area of Russian Republic is more than the area of 14 former Soviet Republics combined. Russia is very rich in oil, gas and natural resources.

- (d) Boris Yeltsin became President of Russian Republic from 1991 until 31 December 1999 when he resigned.
- (e) Vladimir Putin succeeded Yeltsin as Acting President and was elected President in May 2000. Since then he has been continuously in power and will remain so until 2024. He had a brief spell as Prime Minister from 2008-2012. Putin was reelected as President in 2018 for 6 years term.
- (f) President Putin born in 1952 has held high posts in St. Petersburg and Moscow before becoming President in 2000. He has also been on KGB posting to Dresden (East Germany) from 1985-1990. It is during his tenure in Dresden that Berlin Wall fell down on 9 November 1989.
- (g) As for some of the economic indicators for Russia, its area is 17,125,200 Sq. Km and with a population of 144 million excluding Crimea which was annexed by Russia in 2014 after seizing it from Ukraine. Russia's GDP is \$9152 trillion and the per capita GDP is \$ 28,957. The India Russia bilateral trade is \$7.71 billion for 2016 and estimated to grow to \$30 billion by 2025. The present Indian investments in Russia are \$13 billion and the Russian investments in India are \$ 16 billion.
- (h) It was by mid 1950s that India Soviet relations in political, economic, commercial, cultural, defence, metallurgy (steel plants) developed to a great extent. Later on, the bilateral relations rose to greater heights.
- (i) In 1975 India's first satellite Aryabhata was launched on a Russian vehicle Soyuz. Later by 1984 cooperation in outer space grew to a great extent. Squadron Leader Rakesh Sharma was a member of the Soviet mission to outer space in Soyuz T-10 and T-11 from Feb to Oct 1984. In 2007 we signed a formal MoU with Russia for cooperation in outer space. Our missions Chandrayaan-1 and Chandrayaan-2 also get support in terms of 2007 MoU. It was launched on 22 July 2019 and Vikram Rover was to land on Moon on 7 September 2019. It fell

short of that by 2 Kms and contact was lost with Control Room. Gaganyaan Mission announced by India would be a manned launch with Russian support - to be launched by Dec. 2021. Four Indian officers would get training in Russia for 11 months.

- (j) In the present times, India's cooperation with Russia has multiplied many folds. It covers oil, gas, nuclear energy, IT, defence, security, outer space, pharmaceuticals, minerals, iron and steel, electrical machineries, chemicals, precious stones, tea, coffee, tobacco etc.
- (k) Russia has set up nuclear plant in Kudankulam (Tamil Nadu) in 2014 and it will be extended further to units 5 and 6.
- (l) As for defence sector, India's 70% of defence requirements are met by Russia. The latest is India is getting S-400 Triumph Missiles Systems at a cost of Rs. 40000 crores. There are some difficulties as US Sanctions are applicable to Russia for supplying S-400 Missiles Systems to India. India is sure that it will get waiver from USA in this regard. USA had recently promulgated CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). On 6 September 2018, India held 2+2 talks with USA in New Delhi and India is hopeful. From USA Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Defence Secretary of State James Mattis had attended the talks. An Agreement called Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was also then signed which would facilitate India access to advance defence systems of USA. The second set of 2+2 talks was held in Washington on 18 December 2019. EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh attended it.
- (m) In naval power, India also has an enduring cooperation in submarines, warships etc. Soon we may sign LEMOA (Logistics Exchanges Memorandum of Agreement) with Russia. This will provide India cooperation on high seas. We have LEMOA with USA, Oman and France.

- (n) It was in Oct 2000 that India signed 'Strategic Partnership' with Russia during President Putin's visit to India as the first session of Annual Consultations (alternately in India and Russia). President Putin was in India from 4-5 Oct 2018 for the 19th Annual Consultations. India and Russia had earlier agreed to Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership in 2010. The 20th Annual Consultation were held in Vladivostok wherein PM Narendra Modi attended it.
- (o) PM Narendra Modi maintains a close rapport with President V. Putin. It was on 21 May 2018 that PM Modi met President Putin in Sochi for the Informal Talks. Otherwise PM Modi has met President Putin at several international fora such as BRICS, SCO, G-20 and of course at bilateral Annual Consultations. The last meeting with President Putin was in Brazil in Nov. 2019 at BRICS Summit. President of Brazil Joir Bolsonaro was the Chief Guest at Republic Day 2020.
- (p) India is a member both of Ashgabat Agreement and North South Transport Corridor (NSTC). Russia is a member of NSTC only. As such India gets to meet Russia and some of the Central Asian Republics who are members of these two pacts.
- (q) Even in the midst of warm relation between India and Russia, there have been phases of differences between the two countries. Mainly these are on account of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. Zamir Kabulov, Russian President's envoy to Afghanistan has played a somewhat nasty role in creating differences between India and Afghanistan on Taliban policy. Kabulov supports talks with Taliban for peace efforts in that country. He calls Pakistan as a regional player. At the Afghanistan Peace Talks called Heart of Asia held in Amritsar in Dec. 2016 Kabulov openly favoured Pakistan vis-à-vis Russia. In 2017, Russia leaned heavily towards Pakistan and even carried joint military exercises with them. Again, with the differences between USA and China cropping up (trade war), Russia has filled up that vacuum by getting closer to China. This has all been very

uncomfortable for India. But it is believed that India Russia relations have been reset following PM Modi's visit to Sochi on 21 May 2018 and intensifying dialogue with Russia at higher level. It is expected that the present visit by President Putin will set the course to the pristine state in the context of India Russia relations.

(r) Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India for the 19th bilateral Annual Consultations from 4-5 Oct 2018. The Annual Consultations had begun in Oct 2000 and are held every year alternatively in India and Russia and cover the entire gamut of bilateral relations at Summit level i.e. Russia's President and India's PM. In year 2000, the bilateral relations were raised to "Strategic Partnership" which were still raised to "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" in year 2010. The last Annual consultations were held in Vladivostok in September 2019 when PM Narendra Modi had gone there. On 4 October 2018, soon after arrival in New Delhi, President Putin was hosted a dinner by PM Modi at his residence. On 5 October 2018, there were delegation level talks between the two leaders. A Joint Press Statement was also then issued by President Putin and PM Modi. As many as 19 MoUs/Agreements were signed by the two sides including purchase by India of five S-400 Triumph Missile Systems from Russia at a cost of Rs. 40000 crores. American sanctions applicable in this deal with Russia may be relaxed by USA at the request of India. The visit went extremely well and friendship and warmth were amply visible between the two sides.

(s) Soon after reelection of PM Narendra Modi in May 2019; he met President Putin at SCO Summit in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – 13-14 June 2019. G-20 Summit in Osaka (Japan) – 27-29 June 2019, Far Eastern Economic Forum, Vladivostok (Russia) 4-5 September 2019 (PM Modi was invited as Guest of Honour). Two Russian Ministers, Mr. Yuri Trutnev, Dy. PM and Mr. Yuri Borisov, Dy. PM visited India on 19 June 2019 and 2 July 2019 respectively to prepare for PM Modi's visit to Vladivostok. To further prepare for the visit, four Chief Ministers and a Union Minister, Shri Piyush Goyal, were also in

Vladivostok before the visit by PM Modi. Indian Business delegations were also in Vladivostok on this occasion. In Vladivostok, the 20th Annual India-Russia consultations were also held between PM Narendra Modi and President V. Putin. As for the results, India's trade with Far East will be increased, India would participate in ship building industry and further participate in ongoing cooperation in oil/gas sector in Vladivostok region. Chennai and Vladivostok would be connected by sea link. Russia will also link North Sea Sector with its Far East. It will open a new Route on Arctic Circle for navigation wherein India will also be benefited. India would also be purchasing Kamov helicopters with most deadly striking capabilities from Russia.

- (t) An Amity University delegation also visited Vladivostok to inaugurate Amity Campus in Vladivostok. An Amity delegation led by Madame Chairperson Mrs. Amita Chauhan visited St. Petersburg from 26-30 September, 2019. Certainly Amity's cooperation with Russian Institutes is ever growing. Amity University is in close interaction with RANEPA (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration). RANEPA have evinced interest in collaboration with Amity. It is now being followed up further in International Affairs Division of Amity University.
- (u) India's relations with former Soviet Union had thus been extremely warm and friendly, rather on platonic level and the same are continuing with Russian Federation after Soviet Union's break up in December 1991. The bilateral relations are indeed warm and friendly, but on realistic terms. PM Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin enjoy a special relationship, a rapport on a personal note. Russia has also supported India on the recent developments in J&K with introduction of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 on 5 August 2019.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Shri RM Aggarwal belongs to the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), which he joined in 1975. He had a successful career spanning 34 years in the IFS. During his career, apart from a few postings at Headquarters of Ministry of External Affairs, he has been Ambassador / High Commissioner to Angola, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Botswana and Yemen. He has also been Additional Director General at Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), a wing of Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.



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KASHMIR – THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS

*“The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it-
Thucydides”*

– Dave Grossman, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace

Even though the Kashmir issue has consistently been in the news since India's independence, with wars followed by a Pakistan sponsored insurgency, China has never quite as aggressively staked its claims on its territories –with the exception of the events leading to and then in the 1962 conflict - as it has done this summer incursions across the Line of Actual Control. Among the many reasons for Chinese intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the east of Ladakh, has been China's opposition to the Indian government's decision to carve out the Union territory of Ladakh – from the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir - with its borders depicting the territory of Aksai Chin, that China holds and India claims. Over the past year, the abrogation of Article 370 and its clauses that were applicable for Jammu & Kashmir, has taken many by surprise in J&K and abroad, specially the establishments in Pakistan and China. While those in the Valley were angry at the loss of the many privileges and benefits that had become a way of life for the elites and their supporters; for those in Pakistan and China, this move had created several strategic challenges. However, most people who speak on or for the Kashmir issue and insist on the maintenance of the status quo, aren't familiar with the chequered history of Kashmir. For centuries before Kashmir became a bone of territorial contention between India and Pakistan, it had attracted the interests of many an earlier empire.

Early History

From 5th Century BC – KASHMIR - formed the Eastern edge of the Persian Empire, and believing India to be the end of the world – in 326 BC – Alexander the Great , after conquering the Persian Achaemenid Empire moved via Swat to the fort hills of Kashmir, onto the bank of the Jhelum to battle kind Porus. Kashmir was from 206 BC, a part of the ancient silk route – connecting China to southern Europe. Some scholars even believe that Jesus Christ took this route to Kashmir, and is buried in the Rozabal shrine in Srinagar. Rajatarangini, by Kalhana, written in 1148 records Rozabal as the grave of a king, and also reveals that Ashoka the great, brought Buddhism to Kashmir in 3rd century B.C. Islam came to Kashmir with the Sultan dynasty in 1339, more specifically after the ruthless conversions by

Sikandar Butshikar of the Shah Miri dynasty (1389-1413). Kashmir's patron saint-Nund Rishi or Sheikh Nuruddin Wali - converted then to Islam, and thus promoted "Kashmiriyat" the culture of tolerance and respect for the religions and traditions.

In 1819, the state came under the control of Maharaja Ranjit Singh – for the first time under a non-Muslim ruler in 455 years - and in 1822 Ranjit Singh installed Gulab Singh as the ruler of Jammu. By 1834, Gulab Singh's forces, led by Gen Zorawar Singh captured Ladakh, and after Ranjit Singh's death, Zorawar Singh captured Baltistan and Gilgit in 1839-40. By 1841, Zorawar Singh's forays into Tibet, brought him into conflict with the Chinese, and eventually death and defeat. But it set out the northern boundaries of India & Kashmir, with the treaty of Chushul in Sept 1842 – between the Qing emperor of China, the Dalai Lama of Tibet and Gulab Singh.

Kashmir Becomes a Kingdom

The Sikh Empire extended (by an ambiguous 1842 Treaty), into Aksai Chin, a plateau between the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges south of Sinkiang. It also became the basis of both Indian and Chinese claims in the 1950's, and Chinese intrusions and annexation of Aksai Chin eventually led to the Sino Indian conflict of 1962. By the Treaty of Amritsar (of 16 March 1846) Raja Gulab Singh was appointed by the British as Maharaja – having sold Kashmir valley to him for 75 Lakh Nanakshahi Rupees – the amount payable by the Sikh Empire to the East India Company as reparations for the just concluded Anglo Sikh War. Also, by the treaty of Amritsar, the British became the paramount power in relation to the defence foreign affairs and communication of Jammu & Kashmir (just like the arrangement under which J&K acceded to India in 1947).

Following the great 'trigono-metrical survey' of India (that begun in 1855), the Maharaja exploited the anti-British grudge of an Anglo Indian official WH Johnson – who was to survey northeast Ladakh - and offered him an assignment after the survey was done. Thus by 1865, in line with the Maharaja's diplomatic ambition, Johnson's map declared that the Maharaja's northeastern border was a 100 miles north of the Karakoram Pass – and in the absence of other field data, the British had to include this map in their cartographic record, though they were unhappy with the Maharaja's militaristic ambitions. This map, nearly a century later, became a pillar of the Indian claim over Aksai Chin.

After the Congress of Berlin (in Jun 1878), Russia became active in Central Asia, and the rivalry between Russia and Britain triggered the second Anglo

Afghan war (1878-79) that eventually led to victory for a British force consisting mostly of Indian troops. But Russian agents continued to engage the rulers of Hunza (in what is now Gilgit Baltistan) and through him, with Maharaja Pratap Singh of Kashmir. Thus, the British put charges of treason on Maharaja Pratap Singh (the grandson of Gulab Singh), and then signed the Pamir Boundary Commission (in Sep 1896) making Afghanistan a buffer between Russia and their Indian Empire – by giving the Wakhan Corridor, that joined Gilgit to Russia to Afghanistan. By 1918 British led Indian troops fought Russian (Bolshevik) forces in Central Asia in Russian Turkestan, and thus Kashmir became the under belly of Anglo Russian rivalries.

Hari Singh Rule

The Russians began to engage Indian political aspirants with the Bolshevik virus – through the Com-Intern or Communist International from 1919. By 1925 Hari Singh became Maharaja, having come to the throne after delays and controversies. And though the British finally consented to his appointment – but they read out the riot act to him. Even then, Hari Singh began to challenge their agenda north of the Kashmir valley. And when the British leadership in Delhi was watching events in Sinkiang – where a Chinese warlord was engaging the Russians - Hari Singh was keen to exploit the situation in Sinkiang as another Muslim warlord near Ladakh, challenged the Chinese. But by 1935 Hari Singh was pushed by British to lease the entire Gilgit Wazarat north of Indus –to the British for 60 years, for lump sum of Rs 75,000. Moreover, the British forced Hari Singh to enact a Constitution. This gave an opening for the rise of Sheikh Abdullah.

Britian's Game Plan

The newly leased territory of Gilgit cam to be known as the Gilgit Agency – which had 6 of the 8 known passes from Central Asia to the Indian Sub Continent, within a week's march from Gilgit. And by 1943, the British put in place a plan to deny the accession of Gilgit Agency to any vassal state of British India. As Maharaja Hari Singh pursued his own agenda, there was those who were preparing to exploit the situation in his vast kingdom: i.e, Capt (later Maj) Brown in Gilgit, Sardar Mohd Ibrahim Khan in Poonch and Sheikh Abdullah in the valley. More importantly the ground work being laid for Op Dutta Khel and Op Gulmarg by the British; that were both to cost India dearly, just after the partition in Oct 1947. Op *Dutta Khel* was designed to give the whole Gilgit Agency to Pakistan – with as little blood shed as possible and Op *Gulmarg* was to target the Valley.

Sir, George Cunningham, who boasted he could raise a ‘Lashkar’ of 40 to 50,000 men by raising his little finger, had complete sway over NWFP, where he was placed as Governor by Churchill and Lord ‘pug’ Ismay. He initiated a plan to withdraw all regular Indian Army troops from NWFP garrisons and replaced them with tribal levies, with the approval of FM Claude Auchinleck, the C-in-C in India, just before the Partition. Thus began the process of training a tribal force that was put into use in Oct 1947 in J&K. (References were made to this British plan in books by Gen OS Kalkat and Gen KS Bajwa), on how British officers in Rawalpindi and New Delhi were working to a plan, that was to take the Indian leadership by surprise, with the invasion of Jammu & Kashmir. It was the Indian army, with swift airlifts by the IAF – that saved Kashmir for Indian. And though Op *Gulmarg* failed, Mountbatten – as part of the British deep state – only accepted the Maharaja’s accession with a caveat that India must promise to ratify this accession with a ‘plebiscite’ and thus had it inserted in part III of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir.

The UN Resolutions after months of debate had asked:

- (a) For a ceasefire (that both sides agreed on) and,
- (b) The full withdrawal of Pakistan to the original boundaries of J&K (which Pakistan refused to comply with) and,
- (c) A plebiscite, that was to be converted only if Pakistan complied with part(b)

Red China Enters the Equation

After Partitions, as British influence in the world began to decline, the Soviets, who were historically clued into Kashmir, continued to engage with many in Sheikh Abdullah’s administration, (like BPL Bedi, GM Sadiq, Mirza Afzal Beg) as the British and the US, began to state that “political and military considerations could not be separated in Kashmir”. There was talk about the usefulness of military air bases in Kashmir, and the CIA with (apparently) the help of BN Mullik (the Director of IB), supported a force of 40,000 Tibetan (NVDA) led by the Dalai Lama’s brothers. But apparently, they were given outdated weapons, inadequate ammunition, no communication equipment and were trained in the jungles to fight in mountains! All this convinced China, India was playing a double game. Even then, they waited until 1962 for a US assurance, that they would be no attack from Taiwan in the event of an Indo-China conflict.

A de-classified CIA Note (of 15 Jul 1953) had reported in 1952 that China had detailed plans to build a road from Sinkiang to Tibet via Ladakh. This came to be known as the Aksai Chin Road (now highway 219). Also, in 1952, Capt (later Maj. Gen) Rajendra Nath of 11 GR had led a clandestine reconnaissance mission into Aksai Chin. His report is still classified, but was it his report that led to the CIA report or was CIA's report a separate one? Also, there was an intelligence sharing protocol signed between the US and India in 1949. What did they share then?

By 1949-50, the Chinese had annexed a large part of Aksai Chin, overturning the treaty of Chushul (of 1842) that Mao Tse Tung regarded as 'unequal' and China began the creeping annexation of Aksai Chin. Why was this ignored – despite US and Indian reports – and why was the Panchsheel Agreement signed with China in 1954? Even then in 1960, the IAF's 106 Squadron carried out several air reconnaissance missions over Aksai Chin. China clearly had long term plans over Ladakh and also Kashmir. As evidence now shows – Peking's eyes were on the River waters and the glaciers of the region. In 1954, China submitted a list of 9 demands to India – though these were unfavourable for India– Pandit Nehru accepted these. Did India's intelligence and military officials apparently know of China's plans? Did BN Mullick and Gen Kaul chose to ignore the US inputs (by Chester Bowles)? Was Nehru's forward policy based on their advice, that led to the conflict of 1962. China's interest in Aksai Chin apart from Highway 219 – that ran from Kashgar to Lhasa - was the Aksai Chin Lake, which fed the Aksai Chin River and other streams. Its closed catchment area was of about 800 sq km.

The Waters of the Indus

By March 1963, China obtained control of Shaksgam valley – the world's most heavily glaciated region-following on agreement with Pakistan, the talks for which had begun on 13 Oct 62 Chino Indian war – Pakistan's Ayub Khan, encouraged by ZA Bhutto, who saw more merit in being friendly with China, than to remain a US ally (despite SEATO and CENTO pacts). Interestingly, in the 1963 Indo Pak talks, Pakistan wanted all of Ladakh (a Buddhist majority area) from India. It was a sign that its waters and not the people of Kashmir, were what Pakistan had wanted!

The Indus Waters Treaty of Sept' 1960 – a totally one-sided agreement (that gives Pakistan 80% of the waters of Indus of its tributaries) were not enough to quench Pakistan's thirst. There was now a China-Pak nexus that surrounded

Kashmir. As India responded to Pakistan's intrusions around Kargil (in May 1965) and then in Aug '65, Pakistan unleashed Op Gibraltar with quasi-guerilla intrusions across the CFL, China served India a dramatic ultimatum on 16 Sep 1965, to withdraw its alleged incursions from Tibet, in three days. This led to the British PM, Harold Wilson, to promise the support of UK and US to India, if China intervened! A threat of a global war – around Kashmir - loomed. China extended its ultimatum though it didn't intervene. An Indo-Pak ceasefire was implemented after a UN intervention.

The 1965 war also was the first test of Pakistan's adoption of irregular warfare under the garb of it had; as explained in Aslam Siddiqi's "*A Path for Pakistan*" (1964), a civilian bureaucrat in a Ayub's Team, who recommended the:

- (a) Raining of irregular fighters for a national cause (read Kashmir);
- (b) To compensate with superior skills for inferior armaments and
- (c) To disperse widely the forces of the enemy (read India).

This led to the implementation, though without much success, of Op *Gibraltar*; but it can be said to have influenced Gen Zia's agenda "to bleed India by a thousand cuts" through Op *Topac*, since 1989. After Pakistan's humiliation and the surrender at Dhaka in Dec' 71 – Pakistan's army swore to avenge its defeat and do a Bangladesh on India. ZA Bhutto initiated Pakistan's nuclear program as a deterrent against an Indian 'fait accompli'. Nukes were to be the umbrella for the guerilla operations of Pakistan. (This is clearly stated in Pak Army's Green Book - 2000 edition). But the air strikes on Balakot (inside Pakistan) by the IAF, has blown the myth about Pakistan being able to use Jihadist terror groups- under this umbrella - on Indian targets with impunity

Op Topac

In the 1980's the ISI – on Gen Zia's Orders –drew up a plan for a three-phase quasi military operation –code named Op-Topac. In phase one, Pakistan was to initiate a low-level insurgency in Kashmir, which it did from 1989 (following Pakistan's success in Afghanistan and large-scale exodus of Kashmiris to Pakistan). In phase two, Kashmir was to be kept on the boil while the Indian army was to be tied up by heavy firing on the LoC and by incursions beyond the LoC, towards the Siachen Glacier. (Zia had hoped that Indian troops would be stuck in Sri Lanka longer, but as India exited well in time, by March 1990, India had

military reserves to be inducted into J&K from 1990). And in phase three, Pakistan had plans to liberate the Valley, after making it – through the eradication of the Valley’s Sufi ethos and the imposition of Salafi-Wahhabi Islam – into a mini – Islamic state. This led to the emergence of hundreds (if not thousands) of Wahabbi-Mullah led mosques, that saw regular anti-India sermons, and helped in with recruitment of Kashmiri locals for the Pakistan sponsored insurgency.

Today, based on a district wise count, (by JKPF’s Fayyaz Ahmad Bhat), there are nearly 7000 Wahhabi mosques in J&K of which 911 alone function in Srinagar. The nuclear dimension to future conflicts over Kashmir became part of Pakistan’s narrative after the Pokhran-Chagai nuclear tests. During the Kargil conflict of 1999 Pakistan tried to create fear of a nuclear confrontation but what emerged as lesson for the future – that in a short sharp limited - conflicts like that in Kargil, there would be a reluctance by either side to use ‘nukes’ if their core interests and vital cities are not attacked, regardless of threats by Pakistani politicians.

Moreover, studies have shown that in the event of a major military Indo-Pak conflict – following another 26/11 type terrorist attack – the chances of resorting to nuclear responses would be few, if any, because: -

- (a) Nuclear Triad of India gives it a second-strike capability, that Pakistan doesn’t yet have,
- (b) Pakistan’s threat of using tactical ‘nukes’ would in fact harm its own heart land (like Punjab) seriously, not India,
- (c) Nuclear weapons are activated and used if a conflict prolongs endlessly and is indecisive,
- (d) India still abides by its nuclear no – first use doctrine.

China’s Current Agenda

But Pakistan apart, it the Chinese strategic agenda that India must remain alert to, since China was to dominate the world through its geo-strategic and economic agenda, by controlling the sources of the rivers, waters and glaciers that abound in territory of and surrounding Kashmir In 2018, China imported over \$ 230 billion worth of Microchips from the US, Japan and Taiwan in 2018. China’s

National Integrated CII Fund has raised \$ 32 billion in 2018 to help reduce Chinese reliance on foreign Microchips. The first round of US\$22.4 Billion was allocated to 20 companies including ZTE in China. But to fulfill its agenda for world domination, China needs an abundance of water to manufacture microchips. Silicon wafers require lots of water (10,000 liters for its 30 cm sq) to produce, and thus it is the waters of Kashmir that China wants and Pakistan is expected to fulfill that need.

China had begun eyeing Kashmir's waters from the 1950's, thus China occupied Aksai Chin in 1954. Pakistan obtained 80% rights to the Indus river system; even as China began work on the Karakoram highway in 1959 to reach out to the Shaksgam Valley in 1963. Now China is building several dams in the upper Indus area of POK. The Chinese have agreed to finance five major Dams in POK: -

- (a) Bungi Dam in Skardu with a 22km long reservoir along Indus,
- (b) Dasu Dam with a 74 km long reservoir along the Indus to meet
- (c) The Daimer Basha that would store 6.4 million-acre feet of water;
- (d) The fourth dam would be at Patan with a 35km long reservoir and
- (e) Finally, the 4000 MW Thakot project by diverting Indus water with four headrace tunnels.

Pakistan clearly has had a bad record of water management, but complains of India stalling its water supplies – even though it gets 80% of Indus waters. Now with these new projects, would Pakistan get the much needed electricity from these dams and waters thereafter for irrigation OR would these waters be used to for China's long term aims? The one buffer against Chinese control over the entire northern J&K glaciated region from Aksai Chin to Karakoram and north of the Indus, is the Siachin Glacier. If India's control was eliminated from Siachin, then the glaciated waters to the north of India Col, would drain into the Urdok Glacier, Shaksgam River, Yarland River, Tarin and Qurug Rivers and Lop Nor Lake.

However, with Indian ministers now stating that India wants all of POK back – a new chapter over the Kashmir dispute, is likely to open. China has made a lot of investment in the northern areas – Gilgit-Baltistan and Shaksgam Valley – as well as in Aksai Chin. It is unlikely to give these areas up without a fight. As for

Pakistan, the narrative of nationhood rests on the Kashmir issue. And they aren't going to give it up without a fight. The central question therefore is 'how far will India go to claim all of Jammu & Kashmir and at what cost? A bigger challenge for India in Kashmir would be to address the aspirations and grievances of its people, with generations having seen only a low-intensity conflict. To solve the problem 'OF' Kashmir (i.e., to stall Pakistan and China's efforts in the area) New Delhi must solve the problems 'IN' Kashmir. India cannot possibly fight on all fronts.

Maroof Raza has co-authored "Kashmir's untold story" (published by Bloomsbury in 2019). This is the text of the annual Field Marshal Cariappa memorial lecture (the Infantry Day lecture) delivered by the author on 25th October 2019.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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THE INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY FRAMEWORK

“It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honourable and glorious.”

-President George Washington, Former President of the USA

In Dec 2008, three ships of Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sailed into the Gulf of Aden to combat Somali piracy and heralded the first extended deployment of Chinese naval ships beyond the second island chain in more than five hundred years. Historically China has bullied lesser neighbours and received tributes, been bullied by European powers into signing unequal treaties or remained isolated. And, it has had no experience of administering distant lands or dealing and negotiating with equals. Despite being an ancient civilisation, and now having had a place at the global high table since 1972, China is yet to learn to wield power.

After the Long March, making a cold start in 1949, China’s transition through Great Leap Forward to Cultural Revolution was stormy for a quarter century. Meanwhile, successively aided & abetted by the Soviet Union and the United States, it took time to establish own identity. After economic reforms in 1979, it took full advantage of global markets whilst retaining rigid control over the society and absolute control over its own capital investments, to average annual GDP growth of nearly 10% for 30 years and displaced Japan as the second largest economy by 2010. As its economy grew, authoritarian China also made advancements in technology through research & development, purchase, reverse engineering, stealth, outright theft and every other trick in the book & many outside it to become an industrial, technological and military behemoth. Even if presently China’s parity with the US is somewhat distant, the former has developed adequate asymmetry to effectively discomfit the world’s sole surviving superpower.

China’s western international waterway access to industrial raw material, energy and markets routes is primarily through the Malacca Strait. It has sought to reduce this maritime vulnerability through dissuasion as well as persuasion. In

former category, its 'Nine Dash' line claim over 80% of South China Sea (SCS) extends her sovereignty and military might even as it pockets the massive undersea resources. The latter category seeks to trump geography through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Gwadar to access Arabian Sea and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) connecting Kunming in Yunnan region with Kyaukpyu to access Bay of Bengal. China is also establishing naval bases in Djibouti & Gwadar besides actively buying her security elsewhere in IO littoral through massive investments in infrastructure development and large scale transfers of military hardware. All this enables positioning of specialists, labourers, equipment and security paraphernalia on foreign soil without directly offending the local sensibilities. Predictably, unfavourable loan conditions and default consequences are already beginning to haunt some clients. This is traversing the familiar historical trajectory wherein friends are sequentially transformed into collaborators, allies and surrogates who ultimately mortgage sovereignty to become colonies.

PLAN can field an operationally significant permanent presence in the IO only if large numbers and variety are based here so as to minimise the long distance back & forth from mainland which current forays and deployments entail.

Maintenance support facilities and other infrastructure for dependants would also be useable for the PLAN to start with. Once the concept is swallowed smoothly, role reversal would be the logical next step in that facilities would be created for PLAN and their use by host nations would be permitted as a favour. IO is, thus, poised to experience turbulence. Taking also into account the revisionist China's aggressive posturing in SCS and

In the wake of 2004 tsunami, Indian Navy's swift deployment of more than 30 ships and dozens of aircraft, first on its own and later in coordination with US/ Japan/ Australia to provide succour to maritime neighbours contributed significantly in inspiring Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to propose Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, for an Asian Arc of Democracies to come together. It had a brief first iteration and all members, each for own reasons, backed off after joint naval exercise in 2008.

the Western Pacific, the Indo-Pacific sea space as a whole is becoming increasingly unstable. In the Indo Pacific region, United States Navy (USN) has

been a stabilising influence as the principal maritime muscle for more than half a century. With the eastward shift of global economic centre of gravity, rapidly disappearing US domestic appetite for global responsibilities and inexorable rise of totalitarian China; there is greater need today than ever before for a collaborative security framework. In the wake of 2004 tsunami, Indian Navy's swift deployment of more than 30 ships and dozens of aircraft, first on its own and later in coordination with US/ Japan/ Australia to provide succour to maritime neighbours contributed significantly in inspiring Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to propose Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, for an Asian Arc of Democracies to come together. It had a brief first iteration and all members, each for own reasons, backed off after joint naval exercise in 2008. This was revived at senior officials' level in 2017 for cooperation to promote peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected region. It, however, had no agreed official definition and, consequently, there were many versions to it. The 2018 meeting of senior officials dropped allusion to quadrilateral and noted that the countries supported a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region. Parleys continue behind closed doors.

Unmasked Chinese intransigence in all unilaterally claimed or disputed land & sea areas and her rapidly building military capability in IO, enjoin pragmatic definitive action by the stake holders. The Quad founder members are well positioned to draw up the blue print of an inclusive regional framework for this. Admittedly, the doer framework focused on ensuring maritime security which would not be an alliance such as NATO, but will certainly be a lot more than the alphabet soup of consultation/ dialogue platforms currently in place. Its vision statement would need to have ample clarity about modalities and also loadbearing responsibilities. The membership should be open to all stake holders who share the objectives and anxieties/ capabilities. In addition to the Quad, names of European Union as a trading block, France, Indonesia, Vietnam readily come to mind. As it is difficult to cobble up a large group for broad spectrum cooperation, The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Framework (TIP-MSF) could comprise sub-sets of bilateral and small number multilateral sub-regional groupings.

Formalisation of credible TIP-MSF would persuade the fence-sitter stake holders to undertake Cost Benefit Analyses, not simply whether there is more to gain by joining or less to lose by staying out, but the complex dynamic of

geopolitical realities evidenced by China's declared intentions and demonstrated actions.

For the record, the quest for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serving the long-term interests of all countries in the region and indeed of all stake holders, should also be open for China to join. If it does, its acceptance of the charter would make the world an infinitely safer place. If on the other hand, it does not thereby repudiate the charter, at least the bogus assurance of 'peaceful rise' would be given a formal burial.

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EAST LADAKH: HOW THE GALWAN CLASH HAS TRANSFORMED THE GEO-STRATEGIC PARADIGM ON DISSUASION STRATEGY

“The soldier above all others prays for Peace, for it is the soldier who must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of War”

-General Douglas Mac Arthur, US Army

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) committed yet another Himalayan Blunder on 15 June 2020 in the Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh, amidst the Global Covid War, wherein the abominable Virus which emanated from Wuhan Laboratories shrouded many controversies including insinuations of Bio Warfare. Twenty Indian soldiers were martyred after a bloody clash with the Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Barely after seventy-five days of completing 70 years of bilateral relations between the World’s two oldest civilizations, China opted for treacherous and deceitful violence, thereby advertently violating the principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which will never augur well for Sino-India trust in the years ahead.

Supreme sacrifices of twenty soldiers including their organizational head speaks volumes of the valiant Indian soldiers, who are custodians of national security and are responsible to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The superiority of training of the soldiers together with the combat experience in mountainous and high Himalayan altitudes had intrinsic ascendancy over the much hyped and under-experienced Chinese soldiers. The second and third violent and bloody faceoff caused intolerable loss of Chinese soldiers, but the Chinese government evaded owning the deaths in a rather deplorable attempt to cover up their blunder. The year 2020 witnessed the boldest strike back by India in the last fifty-eight winters that stumped the Chinese decisiveness. They had to swallow their pride as they suffered a massive loss, besides lot of criticism at a time when they are already held accountable for the Covid pandemic.

The aftermath of the Chinese crossing all boundaries of peace and tranquility in the border areas and the consequences of their confidence-building measures has become a corroborated myth. The glaring fatality of Galwan was the strangulation

of the so-called trust in China and the PLA; it was the last straw in the series of Chinese misdemeanors. The faith in protocols, practices and agreements over the conduct and desired ethics in the Northern frontiers was forgone by China, with realities crying aloud for fresh rules of engagement to be negotiated hereafter.

The clashes had numerous covert and overt consequences, some of which showed effect in quick succession. The martyrdom of those twenty ‘brave hearts’ acted as a unifying force throughout the nation against unreliability of China, prodding boycott and ban of all Chinese products, projects and all types of linkages. The Indian Government issued a ban on 59 Chinese apps in the interest of national sovereignty and protection of user data, no later than 29 June 20. The move significantly enjoined the global diplomatic landscape to check Chinese expansionism and aggression,

with countries such as the USA also in concurrence, planning their own boycott of widely popular Chinese apps. Another expeditious step taken by India, as a direct result of the Galwan needling by China was a recent hike in defence acquisitions of Rafale fighter aircrafts from France, S400 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Defence Systems from Russia, MH60 Romeo helicopters from America, Drones from Israel and large shipments of ammunition for the three services. With perpetual Chinese maritime intrusive and interventionist forays in the South and East

The fixation over China’s ‘One-China’ policy having been thrown to the winds, the actions of the Chinese have resulted in a call for independent investigation of COVID-19, especially when Hong Kong and Taiwan (most disputed of all Chinese territories) are being internationally praised for their containment of the virus. From the point of view of global economy, there has begun a significant decoupling of international businesses from China, which is only a natural resetting and a post-pandemic reality. The East Coast of China which boasts of a high-scale manufacturing complex and supply chains are seeing a shift, where many countries have decided to move their businesses elsewhere, attributed to a non-conducive environment arising out of the totalitarian regime of the present government.

China Seas, has been much to the dismay of the neighbouring Asian counties. USA’s prominent presence in the area, conforming to its Strategic Re-balancing of the Regional dynamics, all these

countries along with America tend to sympathise with the Indian cause. The recent events conducted with aggressive posturing by China have manifested into outright violation of the peaceful frontiers of nations; China has transgressed advertently in consonance with its expansionist and subjugation policies, thereby antagonizing the nations.

It is important to note that where in the past, India had been too caught up with diplomatic politeness and courtesies, but the Chinese threats and their relentless quest for expansionism has thrown all previous niceties in a flux. Earlier diplomatic rubrics were largely accommodative of Chinese business and territorial sensitivities and prevented honest expressions of the Indian sensitivities, but as of now, projection of undue tolerance and acceptance despite severe discomfort is a chapter, which inevitably India is ready to close. India, as hinted by the aforementioned measures, is ready to adopt a more assertive stance to teach the infamous Asian bully a lesson. Diplomatically, India has done away with many erstwhile words and verses of expression of 'bilateralism' on the Himalayan challenges in expansionism. Indian leadership would go to any lengths in the new strategic paradigm, to project its changed resolve, decision-making and its sheer will to protect its sovereignty. Operationally, the border inclusive of Aksai Chin is the shift from LAC or its status-quo, for long/ mid-term perspectives of politico-military ingenuities. The Red Lines and adequate coefficients have been redrawn to stop progress on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as part of the newer politico-diplomatic and military stance adopted by India, as it adversely affects the security calculus of the nation. The Indian narrative, missions and objectives have been re-calibrated and visibly transformed in good measure, to suit actions taken by the PLA in the escalatory matrix post-Galwan.

The identification of China as a primary threat to national security, more so post Galwan, has further synergized jointness in the Indian Armed Forces under the CDS and demonstrated to the world that India is indeed ready to cross the 'Rubicon' of diplomatic expression on sensitive issues pertaining to national integrity. Indians with great consensus, at this time, have commendably set aside its consumerist needs and shifted their attitude in favour of the newly formulated national policies, which are very coherent and abide with national interests and security.

Notably, the Chinese civilizational wisdom is under microscopic glare, wherein its military aggressiveness and provocative postures in all conflictual frontages, wolf warrior's diplomacy and possible internal fissures, pressures and protests against leadership and systems within are tending to collapse. The combined challenges of China and its proxies/ purchased lobbies have been exposed, with irrational charges being made against democratic and developmental forces for all to witness. The world is experiencing a major shift in strategic alignments and the odds don't seem to be in favour of the Chinese. And while COVID-19 seems determined to reset its course of natural and strategic forces globally, the transformed mould altering all elements of power and security, reshaping economic, diplomatic, military and informational structures in 21st Century.

It is vital that we take cognitive action on formalizing planned 'Strategic Imperatives' with an axiomatic prioritization joint operation plan for the Western and Northern front under the CDS, especially since collusivity cannot be ruled out between the two adversaries in a visualized two front war, which has been evident during the Galwan crisis. We require the multiple intelligence agencies in the country under the various Ministries to be integrated under directions of the CDS and provide quality real time synthesised intelligence on the infrastructural developments, deployments, resource mobilizations, demographical changes, etc on the frontier regions through high end technology modern intelligence gathering mechanisms, which are dedicated all weather support systems for the Armed Forces. This would ensure that we are not surprised and deceived by the adversary and avoid future blunders and blame game shenanigans.

The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has stated that to 'Clean Network Programs' against Chinese cyber threat, the six nodes to be addressed are "Clean Carrier, Clean Store, Clean Apps, Clean Cloud, Clean Path and Clean Cable". To all queries, inquiries, valid accusations on the immoral and unethical transactions, besides the export of Wuhan Virus, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that "this is typical of hegemonic behaviour that runs against the market principles and international trade rules and severely threatens the security of global industrial and supply chains. We urge the USA to rectify its wrong doing, create conditions for the normal trade and economic cooperation between companies from different countries and restore a free, open and safe cyberspace to the world." Meanwhile

Russia is planning to organize a Russia-India-China Summit on the sidelines of G20 Summit in November 2020. The PRC exports to India have fallen by 24.7% year-on-year to \$32.28 Billion, customs data from the Chinese government has shown.

Even with aforementioned challenges and great uncertainty, Indian civilizational, cultural and historical moorings would steer its course towards a better future with greater motivation towards self-reliance and stronger indigenisation processes to improve the sagging economy in all sectors and domains of the Government and private industry, in post-COVID times.

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WHAT PEACE PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN MEANS FOR VARIOUS STAKE HOLDERS?

“Military leaders, many of whom were students of counterinsurgency, recognized the dangers of an incremental escalation and the historical lesson that 'trailing' an insurgency typically condemned counterinsurgents to failure.

-Stanley A. McChrystal

Backdrop

The Loya Jirga, (consisting of Afghan elders, community leaders and politicians) gathered in Kabul and gave a go ahead to release of the last 400 Taliban prisoners, as part of a peace agreement signed between the Taliban and the United States on February 29, 2020. It clears the last hurdle for the beginning of Intra Afghan talks for hopefully, a lasting peace. Apparently, the community has taken a chance, despite many apprehensions of Afghan Government and public, as the prisoners in question had committed serious crimes. A quick announcement of US withdrawal of another 4000 troops indicated US fulfilment of its obligations as per the deal. US may commend its Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, the architect of the deal for allowing the US to withdraw its forces and end its longest-ever war, but the fact is that Taliban controls more territory in Afghanistan now, than at the time US entered the war, and the terror groups like al Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), Haqqani Network co-exist with Taliban, with an opportunity to bounce back, if not adequately controlled.

Was the deal a Compulsion for Afghanistan?

Afghan Government has never been comfortable with its exclusion from US talks with Taliban. Despite that, President Ghani in his address before signing ceremony indicated hopes of peace, based on mutual respect. Apparently, the compromise has been due to lack of any leverage, as Taliban refused to talk to them and the election results have not been convincing enough to put him in driving seat. Going along with the deal, calling for Ulema and intra-Afghan dialogue for durable peace was the only workable option for him. The UN Security Council backing the US-Taliban Peace Deal and the promises of US help in facilitating Afghan- Taliban talks would have comforted him. It is a fact that any

foreign prescription for peace will not work in Afghanistan and intra-Afghan dialogue is the only way forward for sustainable peace. It is also a fact that Afghan National Security Forces still need more capacity building and will be under intense pressure, after significant withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country.

Compulsions of US and Allies to Pull Back from Afghanistan

US-led invasion ousted the Taliban post September 11, 2001 attacks. After losing 2,400 US soldiers, tens of thousands of Afghan troops, Taliban fighters and Afghan civilians and spending more than \$1 trillion, it was appearing to be unsustainable with peace appearing to be only a mirage. The US planners in 2001 would have never dreamt of such an end state, where they will be signing a deal with the same Taliban, promising nothing substantial, in exchange of phased ouster of all foreign forces. Taliban's assurance of not to allow use of the Afghan soil for terrorism seems too good to be true. The apprehensions about Taliban adherence to deal was quite evident in Mike Pompeo's speech reminding them to keep their promises of not siding with al-Qaeda and to defeat IS , and US Defense Chief indicating that it will not hesitate to nullify the deal, if Taliban failed to hold its promises as per the deal.

Besides election promise of President Trump to end the war, a fatigue after 19 years of struggle for peace of another country was not motivating reason to continue further. Militarily speaking US was not expecting a military victory of the order of Taliban laying down its arms, as it could be cost prohibitive in terms of casualties. Complete withdrawal of US forces will also amount to ceding the crucial strategic space to its competitors; hence US has made adequate promise to help Afghan Government in combating al-Qaeda/IS/Haqqani network to ensure that it does not become strong enough to strike its mainland again. It indirectly means that US is looking at some support to Afghan Forces in some form, may be with some air power and some troops, albeit in reduced strength to continue. One more compulsion of US for such compromising gesture could be to reduce some engagements of troops, as some more flash points are emerging in South China Sea and Gulf, in vibrant international scenario.

What did Taliban Achieve?

Under the circumstances Taliban got the better of the deal by agreeing to talk to Afghan Government and promising to reducing violence, in exchange of prisoners and phased withdrawal of US and foreign forces. Taliban would be happy about getting back 5000 of its cadres in Afghan Government custody in exchange of 1000 prisoners. Their promise of renouncing support to al-Qaeda and fighting ISIS is unrealistic, because ISKP, AQIS and Haqqani network are already active, with no visible disturbance from Taliban. The recent attack by ISKP on Afghan prison, housing Taliban prisoners amongst many others, earlier attack on Sikh Gurdwara resulting in heavy casualties, and the new Pakistani leader from Haqqani network joining ISKP, indicates close linkage of all the terrorist groups including Pakistan based terror groups. Taliban and Pakistan may promise not to harbour these terror organizations, but expecting that they will vanish from the region is wishful, unrealistic thinking in light of past credentials of both, having hosted and supported them for so long. Taliban will not sit quite unless it gains power. Even if their leaders put up a facade of giving reasonable governance if brought in power structure, its cadres will not settle down without sharia rule.

Other Stake Holders

Pakistan has a reason to smile for some of its role in talks and Taliban being in driving seat, who were hosted by them in crisis. Taliban, however, are quite patriotic to Afghan soil and did not make any concessions to Pakistan on Durand Line, even when they were in power. The Pakistan Afghanistan border clash earlier this month along Durand line, which is apparently being unilaterally fenced in light of weak Afghan Government could be a quick gain for Pakistan. While a peaceful terror free Afghanistan is everyone's desirability in the region including Russia, China and India, provided it becomes a reality. Chinese are keen to extend its BRI to Afghanistan to get an alternate axis to warm water in Gulf, should CPEC face problems, besides exploiting mineral wealth of Afghanistan. The reconciliation of all factions of Afghanistan with each other, looks to be as difficult as change of behaviour of Taliban, notwithstanding the rosy promises. We have to wait and watch the latest strategic re-alignments taking place in the world and the countries whose National Interests are affected by Afghanistan Geo-political dynamics.

New Concerns for India

India, having made significant investments in Afghanistan, will always hope for an Afghan elected, Afghan led, Afghan owned peace and reconciliation process and a popular democratic government in Afghanistan. From Indian point of view, it may not a happy situation in light of its heavy investments, dim prospects of International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) The growing strength and maneuvering space of ISKP and AQIS, who have interest in Indian subcontinent is a cause of concern for India, although Taliban has shown willingness to work with India. The other major concern is China Iran strategic partnership fructifying \$400 billion deal, which may be an impediment for Indian entry routes into Afghanistan through Chahbahar and further connectivity to INSTC, although Iran has not given any signals of disruption of these projects.

India needs to be in touch with all stake holders including Taliban. India needs to exercise some smart diplomacy to convince US that Indian engagement with Iran is as much essential to prevent loss of crucial strategic space of Afghanistan to China, as much as token presence of US troops there. It is certain that some US troops will withdraw, but it remains to be seen whether this Peace Deal will work, or US pull back will leave stronger Taliban, growing IS, emerging AQIS and suffering population of Afghanistan.

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STATE SECURITY AND THREATS

“The insurgency is still mounting an effort comparable to where they were a year ago. We do something we think will change things, but a month or two later casualties and the level of violence are back to where they were”.

-Andrew Krepinevich

General

Security of a State is freedom from threats to what it values. The State can counter threats by power and diplomacy. Power is both hard (through military might) or soft (through economic heft). In the globalised world, imbalances in power are sought to be balanced by international organisations and treaties. It would be correct to say that the threat of naked aggression in the form of traditional predatory attacks waged by a covetous neighbour have diminished because the global balance is maintained by the major powers either directly or through international organisations. With a near equilibrium existing in the case of traditional threats we see a number of Non-Traditional Threats (NTTs) arising which threaten the security of States. The short article seeks to clarify our understanding of threats to the State.

Types of Threats

In the context of this article a threat is a declaration of an intention or determination to inflict punishment by one State on another State with an aim to force adoption of an action or course or terms desired by the first State. In a broader sense threats may emanate from a non-State, such as those from terrorists, disease (as in recent times from the Coronavirus pandemic), forces of nature, environmental degradation, human greed or threat to a way of life etc. Thus, threats to states can be both in the realm of objective or subjective and also traditional or non-traditional.

Traditional Threat. The traditional threat to a state is rooted in the dominant theory of International relations—Realism. Realism is claimed to be part of an ancient tradition of thought going as far back as Thucydides (460-406 BC).

Realists conclude that the first priority for state leaders is to ensure survival of their state'. Realists consider the prime threat to the existence of a state is another state.

Non-Traditional Threats. The idea of NTTs has its origin in the International Relations theories of Liberalism and its derivatives which have arisen due to globalisation. Of these Cosmopolitanism is of importance because it considers that the world is “one single moral community with some rules that apply to all”. In the NTT sphere, the rise of non-state actors, impact of intra-state conflicts, degeneration of the environment, sweeping demographic changes and the rapidly burgeoning cyber-warfare arena have replaced inter-state wars as the main threats to a nation’s security in the 21st century. This list is not conclusive as there can be other threats in the same vein specific to the conditions in a state. However, Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony head of the Centre for Non-traditional Security Studies at the Rajarathnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang University, states that NTTs may be defined as “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other forms of trans-national crime.” Her definition may be correct for the civilian social scientist but her use of the word ‘primarily’ means that there can be secondary NTTs with a military character.

For military analysts it is such secondary threats which are important NTTs. For them the impact of environmental degradation, climate change, aging/shrinking population are not relevant because their focus is on preparing for and dealing with security threats which arise in a comparatively faster time frame. Caballero-Anthony’s NTTs have a long timeline prior to manifestation, though the results may be as or more devastating than traditional threats. NTTs require to be red-flagged by social scientists so that governments can take timely proactive defensive measures.

Existential Threat. In respect to a State an existential threat manifests when the end result of that threat will be traumatic change in the nature of the State. The military historian Martin Van Creveld has written that States are “Important ‘world historical’ organisations. Each one not just a system of government, but an idea incarnate.” Hence, the most serious existential threat is when the idea of a particular state changes. This could be the result of being conquered and

subsumed, as say Western European countries by Hitler in World War II; of being fragmented into pieces as happened in the case of Yugoslavia; of being greatly diminished in territorial size as happened to Pakistan with the succession of East Pakistan to form the separate country of Bangladesh. Change to the form of government without a change in territorial boundaries is an existential threat to the governing party or some person(s) but are not an existential threat to the State. Hence fear of democracy is an existential threat to the Chinese Communist Party, but it is not an existential threat to China per se.

Non-Existential Threats. These are the opposite of existential. However, in practical terms they do pose a security threat to the people of a state. If unaddressed they could lead to migrations, interventions, rebellions, poverty and degradation of freedom or quality of life. This may pave the way for an existential threat to manifest successfully. The State on its part has a duty to mitigate or eradicate these threats.

Conclusion

Non-existential threats do not evoke the kind of nationalistic fervour as existential threats do. This may be because the people may have different perceptions about the impact of that threat on them. Mostly, such threats may have such long time-lines that they do not induce a sense of urgency that short-term existential threats evoke. Non-existential security threats can range from famine (food security), gender bias (security of women), natural or manmade disasters in the form of floods, earthquakes, pollution etc (security of habitat), ecological degradation (environmental security), disease and epidemics (health security), organized crime (public order security) etc. From the foregoing, it is evident that non-existential threats have more to do with human security than with State security and must be dealt with accordingly, not by the military, but by awareness and good governance.

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FUTURE CONVENTIONAL WARFARE WITH INTEGRATED BATTLE GROUPS (IBGs) ON THE INDIAN WESTERN FRONT

"Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter."

– *Winston S. Churchill*

Background

Battlefields of the future will be extremely ‘complex’ and warfare would be ‘hybrid’ in nature, the former Chief of the Army Staff General Bipin Rawat had mentioned at the inaugural session of a Seminar on 'Future Armoured Vehicles India 2017'. The Indian Army unambiguously emerges as one of the largest armies in the World, consequent to the downsizing of the Russian and Chinese armed forces. However, it is certainly not as powerful, in terms of its military capabilities to undertake rapid military operations in a multi-domain, network centric high-end technology spectrum battlefield. It needs to leverage its overall modernization plans expeditiously, if it has to take on the security challenges of the future ‘Digitised Battlefield’ dynamics in this Millennium.

As India rises in stature economically and technologically towards a more eminent position in the region and world calculus, it mandates augmenting its Military Power to thwart any threat manifestation from potential adversaries. The exigent funds are inadequate, further its compounded by bureaucratic wrangles and risk averseness, frequent changes in qualitative requirements by the Army and occasional corruption charges which result in blacklisting of vendors in an unplanned manner. Hence, there is a need to undertake restructuring of the Army, viz correctly identify the future size, orientation and its equipment needs to execute its role creditably, being safe custodians of security of the Nation. Its only recently due to the Sino- India standoff at Ladakh in Galwan complex, that there have been colossal military hardware purchases from all perceivable funds, with the Government catering to an emergent warlike situation.

India's threats and challenges in the military realm primarily emanate from the historically inherited legacy of territorial disputes involving its two principally nuclear neighbours, over which five wars have already been fought. The growing

collusivity and defence cooperation on military and nuclear matters between our potential adversaries suggests that, unlike in the past, India may face a ‘two front threat’, in the next round. The existing territorial disputes are ‘land-centric’, which highlights the incontrovertible pre-dominant role of the Army in the Indian security matrix. Further, Pakistan, has been running a sub-conventional campaign against India since the early 1990s, which essentially involves strengthening militancy in Muslim majority areas of J&K and pushing highly trained terror modules across the border to keep the Kashmir issue alive. Nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’ is used in conjunction with the cross-border terror strikes, to prevent India from ‘raising the ante’ and striking back with a punitive conventional response in intractable obstacle riddle terrain.

Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

The Army formulated a proactive doctrine known as ‘Cold Start’ to launch multiple swift offensives as part of unified battlegroups of the respective strike / holding corps. The doctrine predicated holding attacks by India's conventional forces to prevent a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan in case of a conflict. This was the origin of the concept of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) expected to be structured after trial wargames/ exercises in 2019. The concept was also reportedly devised, following the failure of the Indian Army to mobilize quickly in response to the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, which occurred at an inexpedient pace taking three weeks to fully operationalize the entire 500,000 troops and three armoured divisions with support services to the Western Front under code name Operation ‘Parakram’ along the International Border (IB).

- ❖ The delay allowed Pak to mobilize 300,000 troops & its own two strike corps, the Army Reserve North & Army Reserve South to IB. However, at the time of the critical strike contemplated by the Indian Armed forces, Pak was ‘ill prepared and shaky’ in its frontline battle positions.
- ❖ Lacking strategic surprise, the Indian Armed Forces withdrew after a 10-month strategic standoff, termed as ‘Strategic Stalemate’, after being operationally ready to launch effective conventional strikes throughout the Western front.

- ❖ In after action reviews, the military concluded that the very sizeable strike corps made them difficult to swiftly manoeuvre in obstacle ridden terrain and that the lack of desired offensive capability of the so-called holding corps was a serious inadequacy for quick military actions against Pak.
- ❖ As a result, CSD was developed by the Indian Army in 2004 to facilitate on a smaller scale, rapid and decisive conventional offensive operations into Pak territory in the event of Pak-sponsored asymmetrical attack on Indian soil before any intervention by the international community and also before Pak would feel compelled to launch nuclear retaliatory strikes to repel an Indian invasion.

New Concept of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs)

It has been very aptly said by a military historian that “Victory in future conflicts will be defined by ability of a force to achieve desired objectives in least time with minimum casualties”. With changing patterns in terrain, armoured vehicles like battle tanks must have the ‘twin capacity and capability’ to operate on the Western and Northern borders. The operational effectiveness of a force depends on its ‘Deploy ability’ in terms of time and terrain for the envisaged tasks. ‘Employability’ across the entire spectrum of conflict and ‘Capability’ to ensure compatibility of force components

While fighting battles in conventional domains, the sub-conventional domain cannot be forgotten, the two must be concurrent and in Hybrid Warfare the use of space, cyber & entire bandwidth of information warfare will be most relevant. There is a strategic imperative today to operationally restructure and refit a big ‘military war machine’ with smart, lean, agile combined arms joint warfare capabilities. The focus being to develop a high-end technology enabled future ready combined arms modular force, capable of decisive operations across the entire spectrum of conflict.

and developing synergized combat power in the projected area of operations, retaining ascendancy of combat superiority vis-a-vis the adversary. Thus, the need for a rapidly deployable, highly versatile, lethal, lethal force to dominate the key operational factors of ‘Time-Space-Force-Information’. Combat restructuring of

IBGs would ensure battle responsive logistical support footprint and its application as part of the joint theatre integrated battle, both on the Western and Northern Front, will certainly be a 'sine qua non' for success in battle.

It was only post Operation 'Parakram', that the operational construct of IBGs for the Western Front assumed prominence with the evolution of the Cold Start Strategy or its variant 'Pro-Active Operations' Strategy. Earlier, the mobilization of formations resulted in time consuming disjointed capabilities, creating adverse force mobilization and application differentials. In contrast, complementary and integrated combined arms strategic concept, poses a more intimidating threat in lesser time frame, much greater than the cumulative sum and consequent impact of the individual arms. Such restructured capabilities matched with force modernisation plans, infrastructure development in the frontiers and C5ISR capabilities will further strengthen our credible deterrence posture and military strategy on the Western Front.

The revisited concept of IBG as part of the force restructuring aims at technology enabled, modular, scalable, right sized combined arms force, specific to a theatre and based on a mission-oriented grouping. The IBGs would combine a degree of mobility, lethality and survivability. IBG concept is based on three foundational doctrinal principles of Manoeuvre Warfare, Directive Style of Command and Combined Arms Task Force, as a war fighting philosophy. Extreme momentum and overwhelming execution with relentless

The evolution of this new retribution strategy based on Manoeuvre Warfare manifested a punitive response to Pak sponsored proxy war crossing the threshold of tolerance, against the backdrop of Pak's nuclear deterrence and international pressures to limit the scope of war. The force application matrix entailed executing a Short Notice Intense Proactive Escalatory (SNIPE) operation by a reconstituted Pivot Corps and Strike Corps based on the concept of "Hit by 'in situation' joint forces, simultaneously Mobilise the Strike Formations in depth and Hit Harder to attain objectives and gain End State. However, somewhere this strategic thought has not fully fructified.

offensive actions, far greater than the adversaries, will be the hallmark of IBG 'blitzkrieg' application. The key doctrinal concept of IBGs is based on the undermentioned operational ideology.

❖ **Manoeuvre Warfare and IBG Application**

The essence of the IBG application lies in the concept of "Pre-emption, Dislocation and Disintegration" as the three experiential means to defeat the enemy in Manoeuvre Warfare. Pre-emption implies initiating decisive operations before the enemy, thereby dictating terms on the battlefield with certain ascendancy. Pre-emption contributes towards gaining initiative and causing partial dislocation. Dislocation implies avoiding strength and striking at vulnerability through manoeuvre. The cumulative effect is physical and moral dislocation thereby paralysing the enemy's mind with fear of defeat. Disintegration implies breaking the cohesion of the enemy by disrupting his command, control & communication systems and striking his strategic/operational/tactical Centres of Gravity (CoG), resulting in physical and psychological paralysis of his source of power, which provides him the moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act decisively.

❖ **Operational Application of IBG on the Western Front**

Pivot Corps IBGs suitably constituted at Brigade/ Divisional level pre-empt the enemy through multiple offensive actions, resulting in partial dislocation up to tactical depth areas. This creates suitable conditions for decisive operations by Strike Corps Division level IBGs, to dislocate and degrade enemy's operational and strategic reserves. Simultaneously, air power, vertical envelopment and operational fires are used for disruption of enemy's CoG. IBGs are used in a multidimensional force application mode co-opting intrinsic attack helicopters, airpower close support operations and destruction matrix of information warfare. In keeping with time sensitivity of conflict, the periodic conflict termination profile needs to be planned in various operational cycles with built in combat 'Surge' capabilities. Certain centralised IBGs reserves on both the Western and Northern front act as dual task formations/ strategic reserves for any emergent operational situation, including out of area contingencies. The IBGs are smaller than brigades,

making them more flexible, lethal and faster in mobilisation, as part of right sizing the operational structure of these forces.

Major difference between brigades and IBGs lies in the number of troops in these battalions, the brigade comprises 3/4 Battalions with 800 troops each, whereas IBGs, commanded by GOCs will have around 5,000 troops each. IBGs will be smaller, better-equipped fighting units with balanced elements of air power, artillery and armour supporting the operations. The IBG will have just six battalions and be able to mobilise within 12-48 hrs based on their location.

❖ **C5ISR and Battlespace Awareness**

The key element of success of IBGs in visualised conflicts will be ‘information superiority and decision dominance’. This is a major grey area that requires much understanding and focus in our Army, ie mix of high threshold of military software programming and technology. Further, C5ISR will only be empowered if we shift from a platform centric approach culture to a network centric approach. In short, we need a knowledge based, decision oriented networked joint force application capability in the Armed Forces.

❖ **Technology Empowerment and Force Modernisation**

RMA and RML combined in technology have also empowered smaller brigade sized BGs to execute effective missions relatively faster. At a more practical level, the synergy of mobility, survivability, and lethality, technically in the design and employment of individual weapons and tactically in the combination of different weapons and arms, will pose a stronger threat as a ‘Digitised Force Matrix’. The cornerstone is to ensure that the combined arms IBG is one cohesive force with seamless connectivity and empowered ISR.

❖ **Empowered Leadership and Directive Style of Command**

Knowledge of employment of all arms and operational dimensions of battle space as the Science of War and leadership cum human as the Art of War will result unequivocally in decisive outcomes of IBGs. Risk taking, audacity and initiative are essential for success. Thus, along with restructuring IBGs, we must focus on building competent leadership and directive style of command embodied with boldness, initiative, audacity, innovative tactics and non-linear thinking. Imperative that IBG commanders fight smart with a non-predictable, flexible operational response to any given situation, thereby ensuring attainment of aim with full momentum and operation fluidity.

❖ **Macro Aspects: Success of Institutionalised IBG Transformation**

- Firstly, obligatory to have politico-military harmony with matching budgetary support towards enhancing operational readiness.
- Secondly, it must foster jointness and synergistic applications at all macro and micro levels.
- Thirdly, a phased approach is necessary through the entire process of transforming for acceptability and permanence.
- Fourthly, the organizational structure of IBG, must address the restructured headquarters, equipping policy, training needs and leadership requirements.
- Fifthly, the need to minimize the logistical and support footprint and maximise battlefield lethality index.
- Sixthly, military hardware and support services must a balanced operational entity for a warfighting machine.
- Seventhly, the most important aspect is addressing the mindsets and infusing its merits at the grassroot level.

Conclusion

The Indian Army is conforming to the 'Digitised Soldier' concept seriously, with immediate induction of new generation rifles, anti-tank guided missiles, latest ground environment Air Defence Systems, introducing futuristic modern light tanks & ICV variants for mountainous terrain, drones with combat, logistics & ISR

variants, self-propelled long range artillery battlefield support systems, introducing AI technologies by DRDO in the next year for designated military formations, which are deployed along the Western & Northern borders. MoD has established a high-level Defence AI Council (DAIC) tasked to provide strategic direction towards the adoption of AI in defence as modern force multipliers. The Defence Planning Committee and the CDS have been interacting towards leveraging defence readiness threshold of the India Armed Forces with enhanced combat power to meet the envisaged challenges presented by collusive offensive defence plans by the adversaries.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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